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Abstract—Haze-assisted mobile health (mHealth)
monitoring, which applies the prevailing mobile
communications and Haze computing technologies to
provide feedback decision support, has been considered as a
revolutionary approach to improving the quality of
healthcare service while lowering the healthcare cost.
Unfortunately, it  also  poses  a  serious  risk  on  both
clients Confidentiality and intellectual property of
monitoring service providers, which could deter the wide
adoption of mHealth technology. This paper is to address
this important problem and design a Hazeassisted
Confidentiality Conserving mobile health monitoring
system to protect the Confidentiality of the involved parties
and their data. Moreover, the outsourcing decryption
technique and a newly proposed key private proxy re-
encryption are adapted to shift the computational
complexity of the involved parties to the Haze without
compromising clients’ Confidentiality and service
providers’ intellectual property. Finally, our security and
performance analysis demonstrates the effectiveness of our
proposed design.
Index Terms—Mobile health (mHealth),
Healthcare,Confidentiality, Outsourcing decryption, Key
private Proxy re encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart phones are became very popular among normal
people because of its wide applications even in health care
also. Remote mobile health monitoring has already been
recognized as not only a potential, but also a successful
example of mobile health (mHealth) applications especially
for developing countries. The Microsoft launched project
“MediNet” is designed to realize remote monitoring on the
health status of diabetes and cardiovascular diseases in
remote areas in Caribbean countries [1]. In such a remote
mHealth monitoring system, a client could deploy portable
sensors in wireless body sensor networks to collect various
physiological data, such as blood pressure (BP), breathing
rate (BR), Electrocardiogram (ECG/EKG), peripheral
oxygen saturation (SpO2) and blood glucose. Such
physiological data could then be sent to a central server,
which could then run various web medical applications on
these data to return timely advice to the client. These
applications may have various functionalities ranging from
sleep pattern analyzers, exercises, physical activity
assistants, to cardiac analysis systems, providing various
medical consultation [2]. Moreover, as the emerging Haze
computing technologies evolve, a viable solution can be
sought by incorporating the software as a service (SaaS)
model and pay-as-you-go business model in Haze
computing, which would allow small companies (healthcare
service providers) to excel in this healthcare market. It has
been observed that the adoption of automated decision
support algorithms in the Haze-assisted mHealth
monitoring has been considered as a future trend [3].
Unfortunately, although Haze-assisted mHealth
monitoring could offer a great opportunity to improve the
quality of healthcare services and potentially reduce
healthcare costs, there is a stumbling block in making this
technology a reality. Without properly addressing the data
management in anmHealth system, clients’ Confidentiality
may be severely breached during the collection, storage,
diagnosis, communications and computing.
A recent study shows that 75% Americans consider the
Confidentiality of their health information important or
very important [4]. It has also been reported [5] that
patients’ willingness to get involved in health monitoring
program could be severely lowered when people are
concerned with the Confidentiality breach in their
voluntarily submitted health data. This Confidentiality
concern will be exacerbated due to the growing trend in
Confidentiality breaches on electronic  health data.
Although the existing Confidentiality laws such as HIPAA (
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act)
provide baseline protection for personal health record, they
are generally considered not applicable or transferable to
Haze computing environments [6]. Besides, the current law
is more focused on protection against adversarial intrusions
while there is little effort on protecting clients from
business collecting private information. Meanwhile, many
companies have significant commercial interests in
collecting clients’ private health data [7] and sharing them
with either insurance companies, research institutions or
even the government agencies. It has also been indicated [8]
that Confidentiality law could not really exert any real
protection on clients’ data Confidentiality unless there is an
effective mechanism to enforce restrictions on the activities
of healthcare  service providers.
In this paper, we design a Haze-assisted mHealth
monitoring system (CAM). We first identify the design
problems on Confidentiality preservation and then provide
our solutions. To ease the understanding, we start with the
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basic scheme so that we can identify the possible
Confidentiality breaches. We then provide an improved
scheme by addressing the identified Confidentiality
problems. The resulting improved scheme allows the
mHealth service provider (the company) to be offline after
the setup stage and enables it to deliver its data or programs
to the Haze securely. To reduce clients’ decryption
complexity, we incorporate the recently proposed
outsourcing decryption technique into the underlying
multidimensional range queries system to shift clients’
computational complexity to the Haze without revealing any
information on either clients’ query input or the decrypted
decision to the Haze. To relieve the computational
complexity on the company’s side, which is proportional to
the number of clients, we propose a further improvement,
leading to our final scheme. It is based on a new variant of
key private proxy re-encryption scheme, in which the
company only needs to accomplish encryption once at the
setup phase while shifting the rest computational tasks to the
Haze without compromising Confidentiality, further
reducing the computational and communication burden on
clients and the Haze.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ADVERSARIAL MODEL
To facilitate our discussion, we first elaborate our
Hazeassisted mHealth monitoring system (CAM). CAM
consists of four parties: the Haze server (simply the Haze),
the company who provides the mHealth monitoring service
( i.e., the healthcare service provider), the individual clients
( simply clients), and a semi-trusted authority (TA). The
company stores its encrypted monitoring data or program in
the Haze server. Individual clients collect their medical data
and store them in their mobile devices, which then
transform the data into attribute vectors. The attribute
vectors are delivered as inputs to the monitoring program in
the Haze server through a mobile (or smart) device. A
semitrusted authority is responsible for distributing private
keys to the individual clients and collecting the service fee
from the clients according to a certain business model such
as pay-as-you-go business model. The TA can be
considered as a collaborator or a management agent for a
company (or several companies) and thus shares certain
level of mutual interest with the company. However, the
company and TA could collude to obtain private health data
from client input vectors. We assume a neutral Haze server,
which means it neither colludes with the company nor a
client to attack the other side. This is a reasonable model
since it would be in the best business interest of the Haze
not to be biased. We admit that it remains possible for the
Haze to collude with other malicious entities in our CAM,
and we leave the CAM design under these stronger models
as future work. We also do not assume that an individual
client colludes with other clients. Our security model does
not consider the possible sidechannel attack [26], [27] due
to the coresidency on shared resources either because it
could be mitigated with either system level protection [27]
or leakage resilient cryptography [28]. CAM assumes an
honest but curious model, which implies all parties should
follow the prescribed actions and cannot be arbitrarily
malicious.
In the following, we briefly introduce the four major
steps of CAM: Setup, Store, TokenGen and Query. We only
illustrate the functionality of these components in this
section while leaving the details in later sections.
At the system initialization, TA runs the Setup phase and
publishes the system parameters. Then the company first
expresses the flow chart of the mHealth monitoring
program as a branching program (see Sec. III-B for detail),
which is encrypted under the respective directed branching
tree. Then the company delivers the resulting ciphertext and
its company index to the Haze, which corresponds to the
Store algorithm in the context.
When a client wishes to query the Haze for a certain
mHealth monitoring program, the i-th client and TA run the
TokenGen algorithm. The client sends the company index to
TA, and then inputs its private query (which is the attribute
vector representing the collected health data) and TA inputs
the master secret to the algorithm. The client obtains the
token corresponding to its query input while TA gets no
useful information on the individual query.
During the last phase, the client delivers the token for its
query to the Haze, which runs the Query phase. The Haze
completes the major computationally intensive task for the
client’s decryption and returns the partially decrypted
ciphertext to the client. The client then completes the
remaining decryption task after receiving the partially
decrypted ciphertext and obtains its decryption result, which
corresponds to the decision from the monitoring program on
the clients’ input. The Haze obtains no useful information
on either the client’s private query input or decryption result
after running the Query phase. Here, we distinguish the
query input Confidentiality breach in terms of what can be
inferred from the computational or communication
information. CAM can prevent the Haze from deducing
useful information from the client’s query input or output
corresponding to the received information from the client.
However, the Haze might still be able to deduce side
information on the client’s private query input by observing
the client’s access pattern.  This issue could be resolved by
oblivious RAM technique [29],but this is out of the scope of
this paper.
Fig. 1. Branching program
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IV. CAM DESIGN
We are ready to present our design CAM:
HazeassistedConfidentiality Conserving mHealth
monitoring system. Toillustrate the fundamental idea behind
this design, we start with the basic scheme, and then
demonstrate how improvements can be made step-by-step to
meet our design goal. Some of the variables in the following
illustration may have already been defined in the previous
sections. The system time is divided into multiple time
periods, called slots, each of which can last a week or a
month depending on specific application scenarios. There is
an estimated maximum number of users N requesting access
to the monitoring program in any given slot. When a client
attempts to access the program, it is assigned an index i
[1,N] by TA.
A. Basic CAM
The following basic scheme runs the BF-IBE system as a
subroutine and is the fundamental building block in our
overall design.
Setup: This algorithm is performed by TA, which
publishes the system parameters for the BF-IBE  scheme.
Store: This algorithm is performed by the company. For
each node pj whose child nodes are not leaf nodes, the
company runs CL(j)=AnonEnc(id,PP,L(j))and
CR(j)=AnonEnc(id,PP,R(j))toencrypt the child node indices
under id with either id S[0,tj] or id S[tj+1,Max],
respectively. When the child nodes of pj are leaf nodes, the
company generates the ciphertext as CL(j) =
AnonEnc(id,PP,mL(j)) and CR(j) = AnonEnc(id,PP,mR(j)),
where mL(j)andmR(j)denote the attached information at the
two leafnodes, respectively. All the generated ciphertexts
are delivered and stored in the Haze.
TokenGen: To generate the private key for the attribute
vector v=(v1,· · · ,vn), a client first computes the identity
representation set of each element in v and delivers all the n
identity representation sets to TA. Then TA runs the
AnonExtract(id,msk) on each identity id Svi in the identity
set and delivers all the respective private keys skvi to the
client.
Query: A client delivers the private key sets obtained from
the TokenGen algorithm to the Haze, which runs the
AnonDecryption algorithm on the ciphertext generated in
the Store algorithm. Starting from p1, the decryption result
determines which ciphertext should be decrypted next. For
instance, if v1 [0,t1], then the decryption result indicates
the next node index L(i). The Haze will then use skv(L(i)) to
decrypt the subsequent ciphertextCL(i). Continue this
process iteratively until it reaches a leaf node and decrypt
the respective attached information.
B. CAM with Full Confidentiality Preservation
The basic scheme has the following security weakness:
first, the identity representation set for a client’s attribute
vector v is known to TA, and hence
TA can easily infer all the client’s private attribute vector.
Second, the client cannot protect his Confidentiality from
the Haze either because the Haze can easily find out the
identity representation for the private key skvi,i [1,n] by
running identity test in MDRQs. The Haze can simply
encrypt a random message under any attribute value v′ until
when it can use skvi to successfully decrypt the ciphertext,
which means there is a match between v′ = vi and hence it
successfully finds out vi. Third, neither can the data
Confidentiality of the company be guaranteed since the
identity representation of the respective range is revealed to
the Haze whenever the decryption is successful due to the
match revealing property (see Sec. III-D) of MDRQs. The
Haze can finally figure out most of the company’s
branching program since it has the private keys of all  the
system users.
To rectify the weakness of the basic scheme, we provide
the following improvement. The high level idea (as shown
in Fig. 4) is as follows: in order to avoid leaking the
attribute vector to TA, the client obliviously submits his
attribute vectors to TA so that he can obtain the respective
private keys without letting TA get any useful information
on his private vector. The client runs the outsourcing
decryption of MDRQs to ensure the Haze completes the
major workload while obtaining no useful information on
his private keys. On the other hand, the company will
permute and randomize its data using homomorphic
encryption and MDRQs so that neither the Haze nor a client
can get any useful information on its private information on
branching program after a single query.
Meanwhile, the company is also required to include the
randomness in the randomization step in the encryption sent
to TA to guarantee that TA can successfully generate
tokens for clients.
C. Final CAM with Full Confidentiality and High Efficiency
Although the above improved scheme does meet the
desired security requirements, the company may need to
compute all the ciphertextsfor  each of N clients, which
implies huge algorithm and computational overheads and
may not be economically feasible for small mHealth
companies. In this section, we provide a further
improvement to reduce both the computational burden on
the company and the communication overhead for the Haze.
The high level idea (as shown in Fig. 5) is as follows. We
employ a newly developed key private re-encryption
scheme ( introduced in Sec. IV-C1) as an underlying tool.
Instead of computing a ciphertext for each client, the
company generates one single ciphertext, which will then
be delivered to the Haze. The company will then
obliviously deliver the identity threshold representation sets
for the thresholds of the decisional branching nodes and the
indexes of the concerned attributes to TA so that TA can
generate the ReKeys corresponding to the rest clients in the
system using the key private reencryption scheme. The
generated rekeys are then delivered to the Haze, which can
then run the reencryption scheme using the rekeys and the
single ciphertext delivered by the company to generate the
ciphertexts for the rest clients. The proposed reencryption
scheme incorporates the outsourcing decryption so that the
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other security and efficiency characteristics in the final
CAM are inherited here. Besides, the decryption algorithm
of the proxy reencryption scheme induces much less
interactions between clients and the Haze comparing with
that in our improved scheme.
C. RELATED WORK
Most of current private telemonitoring schemes [51] are
based on anonymization, which are ineffective as we
alluded before. Another line of work focuses on
Confidentiality Conserving diagnostic programs [34], [52].
At the end of protocol run, a client obtains nothing on the
diagnostic program but the diagnostic result while the
company obtains no information on the client’s private data.
All the existing solutions require the client run multiple
instances of oblivious transfer protocol with the company
after setup phase, which means the company has to stay
online constantly. All the current solutions [31], [34], [52]
are based on garbled circuits, which implies a client must
download the whole circuit to his device and complete the
decryption on his own. Besides, the private computation or
processing of medical information over the Haze has also
attracted attention from both the security community [53],
[54] and signal processing community [55], [56]. These
works can be divided into two categories: providing a
solution for a specific scenario such as private genomic test
[54] or private classification of users’ electrocardiogram
(ECG) data [55], or proposing a general framework for
private processing of monitored data [53] or electronic
health records [56]. Although these schemes are based on
Haze computing, they do not emphasize on how to transfer
the workload of the involved parties to the Haze without
violating the Confidentiality of the involved parties. Since
our application scenario assumes the clients hold relatively
resourceconstrained mobile devices in a Haze assisted
environment, it would be helpful if a client could shift the
computational workload to the Haze. However, there seems
no trivial approach to outsourcing the decryption of garbled
circuit currently. Our proposed system adopts the recently
proposed decryption outsourcing to significantly reduce the
workload of both the company and clients by outsourcing
the majority of the computational tasks to the Haze while
keeping the company offline after the initialization phase.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design a Haze-assisted Confidentiality
Conserving mobile health monitoring system, called CAM,
which can effectively protect the Confidentiality of clients
and the intellectual proerty of mHealth service providers.
To protect the clients’ Confidentiality, we apply the
anonymous BonehFranklinidentitybased encryption (IBE)
in medical diagnostic branching programs. To reduce the
decryption complexity due to the use of IBE, we apply
recently proposed decryption outsourcing with
Confidentiality protection to shift clients’ pairing
computation to the Haze server. To protect mHeath service
providers’ programs, we expand the branching program tree
by using the random permutation and randomize the
decision thresholds used at the decision branching nodes.
Finally, to enable resourceconstrained small companies to
participate in mHealth business, our CAM design helps
them to shift the computational burden to the Haze by
applying newly developed key private proxy re-encryption
technique. Our CAM has been shown to achieve the design
objective.
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